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Introduction and Summary
In Intensional Type Theory (see e.g. [11] ) we differentiate between a decidable definitional equality (which we denote by =) and a propositional equality type (Id ,; , for any given type ) which requires proof. Typing only depends on definitional equality and hence is decidable.
In Intensional Type Theory the type corresponding to the principle of extensionality Ext x2 : x f;g2x2 : x x2 Id x fx; g x ! Id x2 : x f;g is not inhabited. To see this let = = Nat and f = x2Nat:x; g = x2Nat:x + 0 , where addition is defined s.t. x 6 = x + 0 . Using Nat-elimination we can show that x2Nat Id Nat fx; g x is inhabited but Id Nat!Nat f;g is not, because f and g have different normal forms.
It has been an open problem how to extend Intensional
Type Theory s.t. Ext is inhabited without destroying other fundamental properties. Ext is provable in Extensional Type Theory [10] , where propositional and definitional equality are identified, but then equality and type checking become undecidable. We may introduce a constant of type Ext but then, using the elimination constant for Id, we can also define irreducible terms at other types (like Nat). We say that such a theory is not adequate because we can construct closed terms of type Nat which are not reducible to numerals.
The problem of extensionality in Intensional Type Theory has been extensively studied by Martin Hofmann [5] . His basic insight is that extensional equality can be modeled by an intensional model construction such as the setoid model, where every closed type is interpreted by a type and an equivalence relation. However, a naive version of the setoid model does not work because it does not satisfy all the required definitional equalities. In [6] Hofmann presents a solution using a modified interpretation of families. Unfortunately, this approach does not allow definitions of sets or propositions by recursion (large eliminations), in particular this prohibits the introduction of universes.
Our solution is also based on the setoid model but as the metatheory, where the construction takes place, we use an extension of Intensional Type Theory by a universe of propositions Prop, such that all proofs of a proposition are definitionally equal. Moreover, we assume that therules for -types and -types (surjective pairing) hold in the metatheory. We show that this extension of Intensional Type Theory is decidable. Inside our metatheory we define an intensional model which corresponds to a Type Theorythe object theory -with the following properties:
The metatheory
We work in an Intensional Type Theory (e.g. see [7] ) with Set 2 Type and Set Type, i.e. every set is a type. We assume the existence of and -types in Set and Type.
We write the domain of a -type in subscript to signal implicit arguments which are omitted when applying a term of this type. If unambiguous we may overload a name (like the objects and homsets of a category). When introducing non-prefix operators we use "," to mark the spaces for the explicit arguments. The curried application of t to u 1 ; : : : ; u n is written tu 1 ; : : : ; u n . x 2 :fx = f x not free in f 1 t; 2 t = t
As already indicated in the introduction our construction hinges on the existence of a proof-irrelevant universe of propositions Prop 2 Type and Prop Set. The intuition is that Prop contains only sets with at most one inhabitant. This is reflected by decreeing that any two proofs of a proposition are definitionally equal:
,`P 2 Prop ,`p; q 2 P proof , irr ,`p = q 2 P 
Proof (Sketch):
It is well known that the standardreduction excluding the -rules and proof-irr is terminating and Church-Rosser (e.g. see [1] ). On the normal forms we introduce a structural equivalence which incorporates therules and proof-irr. We show that this equivalence is decidable and that two well-typed terms are definitionally equal iff their normal forms are structurally equivalent. Hence = is decidable. It is standard that the decidability of equality entails the decidability of type checking. Logical consistency follows from strong normalisation. Equational consistency can be derived from Church-Rosser and the fact that the congruence does not affect Nat, hence 0 6 = s0.
Adequacy holds since the numerals are the only closed normal forms of type Nat.
The object theory
In this section we shall specify the object theory, which represents our solution to the problem of extensionality. We summarize here the essential properties of this theory, which is an extension of basic type theory with -types (the logical framework or ) including the -rule fortypes. As a basic type we assume a type of natural numbers Nat : Type with the constants and equations as defined in the previous section.
The object theory features an equality type 
Our goal is to verify that such a Type Theory exists and is also decidable, consistent and adequate. The common approach to introduce Type Theories is syntactical: decidability can be verified by a combination of a Church-Rossertheorem and strong normalisation. Our impression is that the approach fails here.
As indicated in the introduction we shall follow a different path here: we define a model of Type Theory inside our type theoretic metatheory and verify that it is has all the required properties. This can be summarized in the following theorem:
Proposition 2 (Existence of object theory) There is a model of type theory with constants and equalities interpreting the object theory defined above, which is decidable, consistent and adequate.

The model construction
The notion of model we are using are categories with families as introduced by Dybjer and Hofmann [3, 7] . This is an intensional notion of model, i.e. definitional equalities in the object theory are interpreted by definitional equalities in the metatheory. Such intensional models always give rise to a decidable theory since definitional equality in the metatheory is decidable.
We give a detailed presentation of categories with families in appendix A. The basic idea is to define a category (Con) of semantic contexts and context morphisms. Semantic types Ty and terms Tm can be interpreted as a functor from Con to the category of families of sets s.t. Ty is the first (set) component of this functor and Tm the second (family) component. We then show how to interpret the empty context, context extension and -types. The interpretation of the syntax and the soundness theorem are given in [7] , section 3.5.
It is cumbersome to check all the details of the model construction, which we will only sketch here. Hence we found it useful to employ the LEGO system [9] . One problem we faced is that LEGO (or any other implementation of Type Theory) does not implement the metatheory described in section 2. As a workaround we use LEGO with additional constants which -expand elements of and -types and map all elements of propositional types to a canonical constant. All those terms are identities in our intended metatheory. We allow ourselves to decorate any type with those expansion terms. See [2] for a partial implementation of the model in LEGO.
The category of setoids
The basic concept of the model construction are setoids, i.e. sets with an equivalence relation. We shall use setoids to interpret contexts hence we define X 2 Con by the following structure (i.e. a -type with named projections):
X set 2 Set , X , 2 X ! X ! Prop X re 2 8 x2Xset x X x X sym 2 8 x;y2Xset x X y ! y X x X trans 2 8 x;y;z2Xset x X y ! y X z ! x X z In the sequel we shall often omit the index of if it is obvious which setoid is meant.
It is important to note that is propositional, hence we do not have to state any equalities regarding the inhabitants of . Categorically any setoid is a trivial groupoid, i.e. a category where every morphism is an isomorphism.
Morphisms between setoids f 2 ConX;Y correspond to substitutions in the syntax. They are given by functions between the sets which respect the equivalence relation: f fn 2 X set ! Y set f resp 2 8 x;y2Xset x X y ! f fn x Y f fn y
The definition of identity and composition and the verification of the categorical laws is straightforward (but requires
Types and terms
Since setoids are groupoids, it seems natural to define types over a fixed object X 2 Con as functors from X to Con. This is essentially the approach we take, but we only require the functor laws to hold up to the internal equiva- A subst f resp p A f re = x 2 X set :A re f fn x A f trans = x; y; z 2 X set : p 2 x X y; q 2 y X z:
A trans f resp p; f resp q To see that A f re and A f trans have the correct types we need that f resp X re x = X re f fn x and f resp X trans p; q = X trans f resp p; f resp q Both are instances of proof-irr since , , 2 Prop. 
Contexts
We have to define an interpretation of the empty context X:A set = x 2 X set :A fm x set x; a X:A y;b = p 2 x X y:
A subst p; a A fm y b
Note that -Prop in its dependent form is essential to type X:A . We have to show that X:A is an equivalence relation. It is straightforward to verify the resp components. We also have to check the definitional equalities corresponding to and hold: lamappu = u applamt = t and that both operations behave correctly wrt. substitution lamt f = lamt f A appu f A = appu f Non-dependent function spaces are a special case of the -construction. Given A; B 2 TyX we define A B = A; B fst 2 TyX
We note that A Bfmx can be defined using only
A fm x; B fm x and we denote this by , fm , 2 Con Con ! Con
This observation leads to a simpler definition of the simply typed universe.
Natural numbers
Given X 2 Con we define Nat 2 TyX by a constant family:
Nat fm x set = Nat The interpretation of R Nat is more involved using the corresponding constant in the metatheory.
The simply typed universe
Given X 2 Con we define U 2 TyX as a constant type similar to Nat -U 0 = U fm x set is given by 
Proof of the main theorem
Proof: The model construction above verifies our main theorem, proposition 2. We have interpreted all the constants introduced in section 3 and have checked that the equational conditions hold. Equality in the model is decidable because it is given by definitional equality in the metatheory. We observe that it is consistent since Id0; s 0 is not inhabited and 0 and s0 are not definitionally equal. It is adequate because Nat only contains elements which are definitionally equal to numerals. Note that we use proposition 1 here.
Discussion and further work
To show that setoids from a category Con we do not require proof-irr, but already to have a notion of semantic types along the lines we have described here relies on this feature of the metatheory, e.g. see section 4.2. In the entire construction proof-irr is needed frequently.
We are not able to show that proof-irr is essential for the construction but experience with previous attempts (by the author and by Martin Hofmann) does suggest this. Having to deal with inconvertible proofs perpetrates the construction and eventually leads to failure. Having proof-irr adds some extensionality to the system, in particular since Prop is closed under -types whose domains are sets. In the pure system it is not even provable that a -type whose codomain is propositional, i.e. has at most one element, is propositional itself.
We have already mentioned Martin Hofmann's work on the subject [5] , [6] . It is also interesting to compare our construction with the groupoid model used in [8] . Note, that the groupoid model requires an extensional type theory as metatheory. Another difference is that the equalities corresponding to subst ; re and trans have to hold strictly (i.e. for metatheoretical equality) whereas we state them in terms of the equalities of the respective semantic types.
We have only presented a simply typed universe to show that our construction allows large eliminations and hence essentially generalizes Hofmann's construction [6] . We believe that it is possible to interpret a full dependent universe (corresponding to Set in our metatheory) using inductiverecursive definitions as introduced in [4] , but we have not yet verified all the details.
It should be straightforward to interpret quotient types as described in [6] . Another interesting application is the introduction of coinductive types.
Finally, it would be interesting to implement the object theory directly, without translating it into the metatheory, possibly using a substitution calculus for dependent types.
B. Interpretation of the syntax
We define a partial interpretation ( , of annotated syntax in a model as defined in the previous section, i.e. terms,types and substitutions are annotated with their contexts and types. We assume as given an interpretation of type constants C , as C 2 Ty 
